Patterns of Social Capital Observed through Land and Water Use in a Farming Village in China\u27s Central Region by Ako Tomoko
Patterns of Social Capital Observed 
through Land and Water Use in a Farming 
Village in China’s Central Region
Tomoko AKO
Abstract
Today, there is a rich body of research focusing on social capital. But how should 
we conceptualize the situation in China’s villages? This article will analyze reasons 
for the lack of development in farming villages in one of China’s central regions, 
Hubei Province, taking into account factors other than those apparent in villages in 
the western region, for example, where the severe natural environment has an impact; 
Human factors can be considered to be preponderant. Based on data obtained in the 
course of fieldwork, individuals are interacting with society as they assert their rights in 
order to protect their interests in public and private realms and attempt (or not) to fulfill 
their responsibilities and obligations.
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Introduction
Economic disparities are continuing to grow in China’s cities and villages against the 
background of the development of a market economy and a binary structure of city and 
country based on the family register system. In China’s west in particular, there are 
numerous villages facing absolute poverty. The village studied in this paper, located in 
Hubei Province, boasts an average income level, but due to mistakes made in industrial 
development and the implementation of water projects, and to mistakes on the part of 
taxation authorities, debt has accumulated and public works projects have ground to 
a halt. Social bonds are weak in the village; while it would be more efficient in terms 
of time and expenses to work on irrigation and similar projects collectively, at present 
individual farming families conduct them as they wish. Coordination of land rights is 
also difficult. Town and village officials have become frustrated with these difficult 
problems and make no active efforts to involve themselves in local issues. The majority 
of young people are leaving to find work in the cities, and the village is becoming 
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increasingly hollowed out. This village, then, presents a classic example of an area in 
which social capital has not been developed, and in which community governance has 
failed to function effectively.
Today, there is a rich body of research focusing on social capital. How, though, 
should we understand the situation in China’s villages? The reasons for the lack 
of development in farming villages in China’s central region are to be sought in 
factors other than those applicable to villages in the western region, for example, 
where the severe natural environment has an impact; ere, it is human factors that are 
preponderant. How are individuals interacting with society as they assert their rights 
in order to protect their interests in the public and private realms and attempt (or not) 
to fulfill their responsibilities and obligations? Based on data obtained in the course of 
fieldwork, this paper will consider the causes of gridlock and instability in a farming 
village in Hubei Province from the perspective of social capital.
Social Capital and Chinese Society11 
Social Capital((( 
In what context did the concept of “social capital” develop? Miyakawa has pointed out 
that the discourse on social capital, which developed in the US against the background 
of socioeconomic changes in the second half of the 20th century, emerged from ques-
tions regarding the mistakes of laissez-faire capitalism and socialism, or the binary 
oppositions expressed in concepts of the market versus the state or the market versus 
central planning.1 Governance via market mechanisms and governance via government 
intervention were each seen as being deficient in numerous ways, and social capital and 
governance by communities based on social capital therefore attracted considerable at-
tention.
One of the central theorists of the concept, Robert Putnam, defines social capital as 
“features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve 
the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action,” and indicates that norms 
of generalized reciprocity are produced by frequent mutual interaction between diverse 
groups.2 The feelings of trust engendered by these mutual relationships function as a 
1 Tadao Miyakawa, Sousharu kyapitaru-ron: Rekishiteki haikei, riron oyobi seisakuteki gan’i [Social 
Capital Theory: Historical Background, Logic, and Implications for Policy], in Tadao Miyakawa 
and Takashi Omori, eds., Sousharu kyapitaru: Gendai keizai shakai no gabanansu no kiso [Social 
Capital: The Foundation of Contemporary Socioeconomic Governance] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai 
Shinposha, 2004). s
2 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993); Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (Simon and Schuster, 2000).
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“lubricant” for social activities.
The farming village in Shayang County, Hubei Province, to be discussed in this pa-
per is a textbook example of an area in which this “lubricant” has not developed suffi-
ciently. The “tragedy of the commons,” frequently referenced in game theory, provides 
an image of the situation delineated by observations made in the course of fieldwork. 
That is, while the majority recognizes that mutual cooperation would lead to greater 
benefits, when cooperation does not succeed, those who cooperated are viewed as hav-
ing suffered a loss, while those who pulled away from cooperation are seen as having 
profited. Because relationships of trust have not been developed, opportunities for mu-
tual benefit are overlooked. But why does the situation unfold this way?
Robert Putnam cites time and money pressures, suburbanization, the spread of elec-
tronic leisure devices (in particular the privatization of leisure time due to the influence 
of television), and generational changes as factors in the decline of social capital in US 
society.3 So, what social changes have affected community formation in a Hubei Prov-
ince farming village?
China’s Unique Networks of “((( Guanxi”
Social capital is a concept that has mainly been developed by European and 
American theorists, but “guanxi (relations)” has attracted attention as a similar 
concept in China. Guanxi can act as both promoter and inhibitor in the organization 
of community. Fei Xiaotong developed the concept of the “differential mode of 
association,” much-quoted among Chinese researchers, which attempts to explain the 
peculiarities of “guanxi” in Chinese society as it has developed under the influence 
of Confucian culture. According to this concept, the domain of guanxi which forms 
with the self at the center expands and contracts like ripples on the surface of water, 
but commitment declines with increasing distance from the center of this domain of 
guanxi.4
Chinese society prioritizes blood ties, and family bonds therefore occupy the cen-
tral position in the domain of guanxi. However, in a situation in which neither mar-
ket mechanisms nor the rule of law function effectively and fierce competition has 
developed, individuals can be observed attempting to manage risk and reduce costs, 
ultimately seeking economic and social gain by means of building guanxi in a variety 
of forms not limited to family bonds. Li Peilin, for example, sees business, blood and 
regional ties intersecting in human relationships within the township enterprises, and 
indicates that personal trust operates in such enterprises in a manner akin to a company 
offering security to a bank.5 Li Yiyu studied elderly associations and educational funds 
3 Ibid.
4 Xiaotong Fei, Xiangtu Zhongguo [Rural China] (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1997).
5 Peilin Li, “Xin shiqi jieji jieceng jiegou he liyi geju de bianhua” [Changes of Interests of Social 
Classes in the New Era], Zhongguo shehui kexue [Chinese Social Sciences], 3 (1995).
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as private organizations in which regional bonds transcended blood ties, and indicated 
that the development of ethical norms was an important factor in the promotion of such 
organizations.6
In general, when special relationships such as blood ties are adhered to, exclusive 
networks tend to form within a context of entrenched interests. Eric M. Uslaner’s con-
cepts of “particularized trust” and “generalized trust” may be considered here. Particu-
larized trust is trust placed exclusively in a specific individual or group; generalized 
trust is trust towards any individual based on a shared ethical foundation. Particularized 
trust is of assistance in resolving only a limited range of problems. Generalized trust is 
necessary in dealing with public issues.7 What type of “guanxi” has developed in the 
case of Shanyang Country? This paper will analyze this question with reference to wa-
ter and land use.
 
Water and Land Use in Xinhe Village21 
The Village((( 
Shanyang County, Hubei Province, is an area of farming villages chiefly engaged in 
wet rice cultivation, approximately 250 km west of Wuhan, the provincial capital. The 
trip from Wuhan takes approximately four hours by car. The fieldwork referenced in 
this paper was mainly conducted in a village in Gaoyang Town. In 2002, upon com-
mencing the study, the average annual income in the village was 2,740 yuan. Agricul-
ture was the only industry in the village, and there were no profitable town or village 
enterprises. Fieldwork was conducted in the village every year since 2002 and on most 
occasions involved the company of Professor He Xuefeng of the Huazhong University 
of Science and Technology. Professor He has noted specific characteristics of this vil-
lage: 
Many of the residents of the village are lacking in respect for the elderly, and the 1) 
elderly residents of the village do not have places to associate outside the home.
Family planning functions effectively. (Despite the fact that the firstborn children 2) 
of some households are female, less than 20% of households have a second child.)
Awareness of clan is weak, and clan relationships have virtually disappeared in the 3) 
village.
6 Yiyu Li, Guanxi yu xinren: Zhongguo xiangcun minjian zuzhi shizheng yanjiu [Network and Trust: 
Empirical Studies of Chinese Rural Civic Organizations] (Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 
2004).
7 Eric M. Uslaner, “Chishiki shakai ni okeru shinrai” [Trust in the Knowledge Society], in Tadao 
Miyakawa and Takashi Omori, eds., Sousharu kyapitaru: Gendai keizai shakai no gabanansu no 
kiso [Social Capital: The Foundation of Contemporary Socioeconomic Governance], Chapter 4.
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Few households build new houses within the village; if possible, new residences 4) 
are built alongside the road or in the town.
The majority of villagers who leave the village to find work elsewhere do not re-5) 
turn to the village.
The desire to protect family farmland is diminishing (young people in particular 6) 
display little interest).
In addition, a conspicuous decline in the status of governance in the village was ob-
served, as evidenced by a number of conditions:
Infrastructure such as roads, reservoirs, dikes, etc. is being neglected.1) 
There is little provision for entertainment in the village, and the majority of villag-2) 
ers spend their free time and the agricultural off-season playing mahjong.
Many of the villages have extensive debts. (Less than 10% of the villages has no 3) 
debt.)
Electricity payments are often misappropriated and electricity is often stolen, with 4) 
the result that fewer residents are paying electricity fees and the electricity supply 
is frequently disconnected.
Public order is declining and theft is increasing. (Crops are sometimes stolen prior 5) 
to harvest, and materials are stolen from building sites.)
The number of students leaving school prematurely is increasing.6) 8
The author worked from 2001-2003 at the Embassy of Japan in China overseeing ir-
rigation projects and the promotion of elderly associations in Gaoyang Town as part of 
the Japanese government’s grass-roots grant aid program. During this period a tent was 
set up so as to watch over building materials at night and prevent potential theft. Dur-
ing fieldwork in the latter half of June 2003, the head of a village group dug trenches 
in a public road in an attempt to drain rainwater from his own fields. Upon being con-
fronted, he persisted in digging, and though the police were directly notified about this 
activity, they failed to take any action in the matter. According to Professor He, this 
type of self-oriented action is not unusual in the area. Many villagers can be seen play-
ing mahjong during the day, and there are numerous signs of neglect, such as garbage 
scattered in the streets. The number of farm plots that have run wild because the right-
ful proprietors have left the village to find work and have not returned is also increas-
ing.
8 Xuefeng He, “Zaoyu xuanju de xinagcun shehui: Jingmen shi disijie cunweihui xuanju guancha” 
[Rural Society Encountering Election: Report of the 4th Village Government Election in Jingmen City] 
(Xian:Xibei daxue chubanshe, 2002).
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The Collapse of the Collective Irrigation System((( 
Between the latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s, the region’s farmers became frus-
trated with excessive taxes and fees and refused to make payments. For this reason, the 
villages of Gaoyang Town now have extensive debts. The town and village authorities 
have attempted to fulfill their duties to make payments to higher authorities, but in do-
ing so have had to take out loans at high rates of interest that have caused the debts to 
swell further. This has intensified the villagers’ mistrust of the government, and they 
make no attempt to cooperate when new public works projects are planned. The major-
ity of the water use facilities built on the principle of “self-reliance” under the leader-
ship of Mao Zedong have been left in disrepair, and the efficiency of irrigation is de-
clining. Some of the watercourses observed by the author were clogged with weeds and 
were serving as breeding grounds for large numbers of crayfish, refusing to flow even 
in periods of rain.
Xinhe Village, consisting of 1,186 inhabitants in 307 households and forming eight 
village groups, has favorable water-use conditions, and declines in the harvest are rare 
even during periods of drought. A pumping station built in 1976 was designed to ir-
rigate 10,000 mu in the surrounding four villages, but maintenance has been neglected 
and its limit has fallen to 5,000 mu. In addition, defaulting on electricity payments and 
the payment of wages to workers has left the villages approximately 200,000 yuan in 
debt, and the pumping station is almost entirely out of operation. Debt related to the 
pumping station accounts for the greater part of Xinhe Village’s 1,413,600 yuan debt.
There are a number of factors involved in the debt related to the pumping station. 
The first of these is an increase in management costs. When the pumping station was in 
regular operation, the local authorities assigned their children and relatives to positions 
at the station, resulting in a greater than necessary number of employees and a conse-
quent increase in personnel costs. In addition, in 2003 reform of the farming village 
taxation system commenced, and the village was no longer able to levy the village re-
tention and township comprehensive fees as a common service charge. The beneficia-
ries of the pumping station were now required to operate the unit at their own expense. 
When the farming tax was scrapped in 2005, the village and town authorities were no 
longer able to levy taxes, and at the same time they lost the ability to exercise their own 
discretion in financial matters. With the loss of the village retention and township com-
prehensive fees, it became difficult to pay employees’ salaries even at the base rate. In 
addition, charges for water were establishe/d based on the principle that the beneficiary 
pays, and an increasing number of farmers demonstrated reluctance to pay or withheld 
payments (Table 1).
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FISCAL YEAR AMOUNT
1999 28280
2000 14818.5
2001 25330
Total 68428.5
Table (: 
Debt held by residents of Xinhe Village for use of pumping station (yuan(
Source: Interviews conducted in Xinhe Village
The beneficiary-pays principle at first appears to be an effective system, but water-
use conditions vary in agricultural areas, and the situation is inequitable if fees are cal-
culated based simply on the period of water use and the amount of land irrigated. There 
is also the problem that when each family begins drawing water for the benefit of their 
own plot, irrigation can no longer be conducted with consideration of the entire region-
al water system. In addition, decrepit equipment has not been upgraded and machinery 
operates with poor energy efficiency; this has generated a vicious cycle in which op-
erating costs have increased, and there has been no option but to increase water costs 
year by year (Table 2).
YEAR WATER INTAKE PRICE（YUAN/HOUR)
1977－ 1982 23
1985－ 1990 52.2
1991 58.59
1992 58.3
1993 109
1994－ 1995 124
1996－ 2002 219.8
2003 180
Table (：Change of Water Intake Prices for the Xinhe Pump Station.
Source: Interviews conducted in Xinhe Village
The Xinhe pumping station began to operate at a loss in 1998, and the associated 
debt grew to 200,000 yuan by 2000. In the same year, the provincial Water Bureau 
transferred the management rights for the station to the town authorities. The authori-
ties operated the station for a year, after which, in 2002, they contracted several former 
employees to oversee its operation. In 2003, the town authorities partially upgraded the 
station at a cost of several thousand yuan and sold operating rights for a period of fif-
teen years to a private company for 200,000 yuan.
However, the privatization of the pumping station did not resolve the associated 
problems. The system of water use is complex, and water-use conditions differ for 
different areas of land; because of this, many people feel that the beneficiary-pays 
principle is unfair. As a result, the number of farming households who choose not rely 
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on shared water use but rather dig their own wells and draw water using small pumps 
and plastic hoses is increasing. The pumping station will not operate unless payment is 
made even in a drought, and this situation is affecting agricultural production.
(3) The Difficulty of Coordinating Land Use Rights
A portion of fieldwork was conducted in Xinhe Village in September 2007. According 
to statistical records held by the head of the Women’s Federation responsible for fam-
ily planning in the village, as of January 2007 the village’s population was 1,168, and 
the fluid population was 271. Of the latter, 59 individuals traveled within the county, 
133 individuals traveled outside the county but within the province, and 79 individuals 
traveled outside the province. A further count based on information from an informant 
familiar with the situation of all the families in the village indicated that the working 
population (aged 18-60; not including individuals who have changed their place of 
registration due to attending university or joining the army) was 696, and that 352 indi-
viduals had left the village to find work, 79 of whom left without notifying the village 
authorities.
A more detailed study of 55 households in the fourth group in Xinhe Village showed 
that of a working population of 129 people, 64 had left the village to find work, eight 
households no longer possessed rights to land, and two households produced virtually 
no crops. In addition, 25 farming households had moved away from the village. (Some 
of these also changed their place of registration.) The fourth group was originally resi-
dent in three compounds, organized for the He family, the Wu family and the Chen 
family, but as the population increased and space was no longer available, houses came 
to be built outside the compounds. There was a strong tendency for these houses to be 
built in convenient locations, e.g., beside roads.
As indicated above, the number of people leaving Xinhe Village and the surrounding 
area to find work has increased, and there has been ongoing trouble regarding land that 
has been rented out while the villagers with rights to it are working away from the vil-
lage. Before this issue is addressed, a brief look at the land system in Chinese farming 
villages is in order.
Under the contemporary land system as it relates to China’s farming villages, collec-
tives (villages, village groups, economic organizations managed by the villages, etc.; 
some of the collectives exist at the town level) hold property rights to farm land, and 
villagers are allocated rights to contract the land for crops. The right to use the land can 
be transferred when land is rented to a third party, be it an individual or an organiza-
tion. This transfer can take a variety of forms.9(Table 3). 
9 For more on the land system in Chinese farming villages, see Tomoko Ako, “Chugoku nouson 
no tochi seido ni kansuru shomondai to kaikaku no doukou” [Problems of the Land System in Chi-
nese Farming Villages and the Direction of Reform], Kokusai nouringyou kyouryoku [Japan Asso-
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ZhuanbaoA. （转包）
Contract of land use rights continues after transfer of 
land use right. The party that has the first land use right 
keeps rights and obligations related to the land use. Most 
households that do not want to abandon land use rights 
take this form of transfer.
ZhuanrangB. （转让）
All or part of land use responsibilities are placed in a third 
party after receiving permission from the collective that 
has the land ownership. Rights and obligations related 
to land use are transferred to the third party and the 
contractual relationship between the original contractor 
and the collective is ceased (during the contract period 
with the third party).
HuhuanC. （互换）
Land is exchanged between households or collectives to 
avoid fragmentation and inefficiency of land use. Rents 
are collected if there are renters.
ZulinD. （租赁） Rents are collected by renting all or a part of lands. 
Fanzudaobao E. 
（反租倒包）
A collective takes up lands on contract from members of 
the collective and makes a new contract with the third 
party.
RuguF. （入股）
Value of land use rights are quantified and exchanged 
into stocks. Dividend is decided depending on profits 
earned from land management.
Table 3：Forms of Transfer of Land Use Right
In the case of Xinhe Village, almost no transfers are of the type shown as E and F in 
Table 3. This is because the villagers are not engaged in the production of commercial 
crops from which high profits would be generated from large-scale production achieved 
via the formation of companies or the establishment of shares. Aggregation of land that 
has been broken up under the family contract system using method C is also rarely ob-
served. One factor behind this is presumably the difficulty of readjusting boundaries in 
an area in which there are considerable differences in elevation and numerous swampy 
areas; it would also involve increased costs for irrigation. The vast majority of transfers 
in Village Y are transfers of rights to work land between siblings, parents and children, 
or acquaintances using method A.
In Shayang County, the contract period for land was extended by 30 years in 1997. 
This was done in an extremely unsatisfactory manner, and 4,932 claims emerged when 
the provincial government instructed local authorities to confirm land rights in Novem
ber 2004.10 Farmers who had abandoned cultivation under a heavy burden of taxes 
ciation for International Collaboration of Agriculture and Forestry] (Feb/Mar 2003).
10 Author’s interview with Professor He Xuefeng in the summer of 2005.
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and fees began to demand that their land be returned. Meanwhile, there was a signifi-
cant increase in the profitability of the land as a result of the reforms of the tax system 
that commenced in 2002. Prior to the reforms, the town administration had levied the 
township comprehensive fee for compulsory education, family planning, compensation 
for demobilized soldiers, training of the citizen militia and road construction, and the 
village had levied the village retention fee for public works, social security and man-
agement expenses (payment of administrative salaries and management expenses). Fol-
lowing the reforms, these levies were all abolished. In addition, in 2006 the farm tax on 
the output of land possessed by farming families was abolished, and direct aid for food 
production was introduced.
In the latter half of the 1990s, a succession of farmers abandoned cultivation, and 
in an attempt to find a solution for the tax burden, the village administration organized 
meetings, reduced taxes and tried to allocate abandoned land to the families remaining 
in the village. Numerous farming families refused these offers, but the village admin-
istration made efforts to convince them to accept, and the majority of the abandoned 
land was allocated. Shayang County is an area of low hills, and fields located on top 
of these hills are distant from water sources and difficult to irrigate. Fields located on 
lower ground close to canals and lakes are prone to flooding. The majority of fields that 
were abandoned were of these types. Farmers who accepted the hilltop fields planted 
them with willows, while the purchasers of the low-lying fields dug ponds and raised 
fish. Some farmers also accepted hilltop land under a scheme to return fields to forests, 
which was being actively promoted at the time, and were able to have the fields certi-
fied as forested land so as to receive benefits under the scheme.
As noted above, when it became possible to expect profits from cultivating crops, 
numerous farming families sought to return to the land. Families who had undertaken 
the cultivation of abandoned fields could not accept that these other families, who had 
abandoned their tax responsibilities, now wished to return to farming. They refused 
to return the land unless they were compensated for costs incurred purchasing seed-
lings, leveling the ground, purchasing machinery and digging ponds, and for losses 
incurred by terminating their contracts before their expiry. The village was already in 
debt and had no financial leeway for the payment of compensation for damages. In 
some cases, the farmers recognized as holding rights to the land in the second exten-
sion of contract periods in 1997 were different from those who had been granted con-
tracting rights in 1983, and conflicts arose over which should be granted priority.11　
The 30-year contract period remains valid in the farm land contract system, and as a 
basic principle the system does not allow reallocation of contract rights or resurveying
 
11 Baifeng Chen, “Dui wo guo nongcin chengbaoquan wuquanhua de fansi” [Reflection on Our 
Country’s Property Right of Contracted Farm Land], Qinghua falu pinglun [Tsinghua Law Review], 
1 (2007).
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of land. However, it does allow “minor adjustments” for the sake of maintaining the 
stability of the system, and also allows fair, open, equitable and democratic cooperation. However, 
an emergency notification regarding appropriate measures to deal with conflict over 
rights to contract land issued by the General Office of the State Council in 2004 
stipulated that land should be returned to the families who held the contract rights to 
the land at the time of the extension of the contract period, and that they should be 
allowed to continue to cultivate the land in the event that they returned to the village 
after seeking work elsewhere. This vague rule made it difficult even for the courts to 
respond to trouble arising over land claims. In many cases, it was difficult to achieve 
reconciliation, and legal expenses could not be recovered.
During the period of fieldwork in Xinhe Village, the heads of two neighboring 
households spoke separately about their conflict over rights to a small reservoir. Ac-
cording to one of these men, he had been threatened by thugs hired locally by the other 
farmer, and he had a wound where they had cut his leg. As this indicates, opportunities 
for the involvement of criminal organizations have increased where the police and the 
courts have proven ineffective.
While the number of farmers returning to Xinhe Village is increasing, as indicated 
above, approximately half of the village’s labor force was still missing as of September 
2007. If the land could be farmed intensively, irrigation would become more conve-
nient and productivity would increase. The government has therefore attempted in sev-
eral areas to aggregate land via exchange of plots, but this act has seen limited success.
Entertainment / Congratulatory Gifts / Family Relations((( 
As has been made clear above, coordination of water and land use in farming villages 
in Shayang County faces numerous difficulties. To conclude this study, we will con-
sider the characteristics of personal relations in the area by looking at the status of en-
tertainment and the offering of congratulatory gifts.
The chief form of entertainment in the district is mahjong, but a lottery called Mark 
6 has also recently become popular. While the lottery is conducted legally in Hong 
Kong, it is not legal on the Chinese mainland. During fieldwork, many people were 
seen enthusiastically discussing the lottery while perusing publications containing 
number-buying hints. “What number did you buy?” seemed to have become a standard 
greeting among them. Numbers can be purchased at low cost and payment of stake 
money deferred, making the lottery extremely popular.
Farmers are said to make up more than 90% of the purchasers of Mark 6 in China. A 
survey conducted by a Guangdong farming village socioeconomic survey unit in De-
cember 2003 indicated that the economic scale of the Mark 6 lottery was 3,320 million 
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yuan (approximately 52.124 billion yen) across the entire province.129 The popularity 
of Mark 6 shows that an increasing number of farmers are developing a spirit of risk-
taking, but criminal organizations are operating below the surface, and there is a hidden 
danger of the lottery becoming more than a mere diversion, with increasing numbers of 
suicides and family breakups due to lottery-related debt being reported.
An event held during the period of fieldwork to celebrate the university entrance of 
one of the daughters of a family who served as a personal host on occasion was also of 
considerable interest. The girl qualified for entrance to the Wuhan University of Sci-
ence and Technology, and a special event was held in celebration of the fact. A large 
number of tables were set up in the family’s inner courtyard, and the local women, 
along with a specially-hired cook, prepared a wide variety of dishes such as dumplings 
made of pork and sticky rice. While an event following the pattern of traditional vil-
lage celebrations was expected, it actually involved a performance on a special stage 
by a group of performers hired for the day at 1,800 yuan. Guests offered a congratu-
latory gift of money at the entrance, and depending on the amount were then able to 
request songs from the performers. The main families in the village are said to be able 
to collect considerable sums in congratulatory gifts by holding this type of event due 
to the large number of visitors. The performances were very enjoyable, with comedy 
skits and short sketches in the local dialect, but at one stage a performer commenced 
a sexually suggestive “Indian-style” dance that embarrassed the audience. The dancer 
successively removed items of clothing onstage as the surrounding noise grew to echo 
throughout the village; meanwhile, the girl who should have been the center of atten-
tion tried to make herself inconspicuous.
As this suggests, originally modest celebrations that unite families and neighbors are 
becoming increasingly extravagant and taking on a more commercial cast every year. 
It is also no doubt the case that the nature of festivities and leisure activities are chang-
ing among younger populations who have grown accustomed to city life through their 
experiences working away from the village.
These differences in ways of thinking between different generations are also affect-
ing family relationships. In the fourth group of Xinhe Village, 60-70% of elderly resi-
dents live alone, and the number of children who choose not to care for their aging par-
ents is said to be increasing. One elderly resident who was not provided with sufficient 
food by his son and daughter-in-law was forced to perform hard labor such as tending 
cattle and harvesting wheat, and was severely rebuked if he became tired and could not 
perform his tasks. He was later discovered dead close to the pumping station. A former 
12 Huiru Liang, “Guandong liuhecai yinian juanzou nongmin shisanyi” [Mark Six Took 1.3 Billion 
Yuan of Peasants’ Earnings a Year in Guangdong], Xinxi shibao [Information Times] (27 August, 
2004).
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party secretary stated that while there was a possibility of suicide, the old man had col-
lapsed in a shallow area of water and may have been unable to save himself due to ex-
haustion brought upon by overwork without sufficient nourishment.
Conclusion31 
Trouble related to water use and rights to land is not specifically isolated to Shayang 
County. These problems are particularly conspicuous in farming villages in China’s 
central region, where geographical conditions are complex, and there is a great deal of 
human movement due to the necessity to find work outside the villages. However, there 
exist areas that suffer under the same conditions, but in which problems are resolved 
by mutual assistance between family members and neighbors. In Ji’an in Jiangxi Prov-
ince, for example, fields for which use rights are held by people who leave to find 
work outside the village are managed by siblings, relatives or acquaintances to ensure 
that they are not abandoned. There is an awareness among the residents that a tended 
field should not be left to run wild.13 If an individual returns to the village after having 
worked elsewhere, their fields will be returned and farm work is able to continue as it 
had previously. If it is necessary to pay any fees, the problem can be resolved through 
discussion. Unlike the situation in Shayang County, there is no failure to compromise 
due to reluctance to relinquish personal profit.
Villages, in particular natural villages, are the most fundamental units for the orga-
nization of public services. The government cannot resolve issues by directly involving 
itself in people’s lives and agricultural production. However, in the present situation 
in which many residents leave villages with their names still in family registers, there 
is an absolute shortage of manpower to reinvigorate local economies and undertake 
public works. In addition, an increasing number of residents who remain in the villages 
lack the sense of being a member of a collective.
Yan has pointed out that “uncivil individuals,” extremely self-oriented individuals 
who strongly assert their own rights and lack respect for others and a sense of social re-
sponsibility, are becoming increasingly conspicuous in contemporary Chinese farming 
villages.1410 Yan indicates that as the state reduces its level of involvement in the lives 
of citizens and China’s population rapidly adapts to free market principles under a glob-
al economy—and there has also been an effect from family planning policies and labor 
13 Baifeng Chen, “Dui wo guo nongcin chengbaoquan wuquanhua de fansi” [Reflection on Our 
Country’s Property Right of Contracted Farm Land], Qinghua falu pinglun[Tsinghua Law Review] , 
1 (2007).
14  Yunxiang Yan, Private Life Under Socialism: Love, Intimacy, and Family Change in a Chinese 
Village, 1949-1999 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003).
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migration—marital relationships, management of family finances, the raising of the 
next generation, and the sense of respect for the elderly are undergoing considerable 
changes, public-spiritedness is becoming attenuated, and social order is declining.
The contemporary nuclear family, with its emphasis on private life, is generally con-
sidered to have evolved as a result of industrialization, urbanization, population move-
ments, and the development of the market economy. Yan, however, points out that the 
process displays different characteristics in China, where state policy has intervened 
in family life, and the government has strictly enforced participation in public activi-
ties. There has been a strong tendency for public involvement to occur not by personal 
choice but by institutionalization; an example of this trend is the introduction of the 
New Marriage Law, which abolished traditional patriarchal authority in the collectiv-
ization of farming, and in a large number of political movements. This dependence 
on systematic organization is undergoing changes with the development of a market 
economy. Against this background, patriarchal authority has not been recovered and 
the social function of the family is being lost while moral and ideological vacuums are 
forming, leading to conditions likely to produce individuals with no sense of public 
morality.
Such individuals seek to develop relationships of “particularized trust,” as defined 
by Uslaner, in order to maximize their personal economic profit in a situation of fierce 
market competition. In the past, while it was imposed from the top down, a certain type 
of “generalized trust” was maintained by collective structures, chiefly the family and 
citizens’ collectives. Under the present circumstances, however, where individuals are 
living separately and are losing their sense of regional identity, their sense of morality, 
and their sense of the mission of socialism, it is difficult to halt regional decline.
Tsai points out that informal accountability has played an important role in the pro-
motion of public works projects in China’s farming villages. In the village in which 
Tsai conducted her fieldwork, groups, families and clans connected with the local 
temple shared a public spirit and a sense of moral responsibility, giving them a greater 
feeling of solidarity. Even the village authorities participated in some capacity in these 
“solidarity groups.” If such solidarity groups could form in Shayang County, it would 
no doubt increase the number of people who take an active role in the resolution of the 
region’s problems.
China remains a developing country, and administrative system-building has lagged 
behind. If it is possible, however, to build public order and foster culture in the coun-
try’s regions by, for example, nurturing the traditional family culture, and promoting 
the development of citizens’ organizations able to work together towards common 
goals, the cohesiveness of regional society would be enhanced, and public works would 
also benefit. What is needed is for more intense efforts to be made towards the develop-
ment of social capital.
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